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ABSTRACT
The concept of moral rights - that is, whether an author has
personal rights over his work that go beyond property rights - created
tensions between the European Union and the United States during
the negotiations of international intellectual property agreements.
This paper examines that conflict through the prism of international
copyright and trade law, specifically the Berne Convention and the
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
(TRIPS). As trade relations have been subsumed by international
copyright law, the time seems appropriate to revisit the French-born
legal notion of moral rights. Although it has been excluded from the
TRIPS agreement (much to the United States’ relief), this issue has
resurfaced in today’s globalized and digital world, as authors may
acquire rights that they do not have at home by crossing borders. This
paper delves into the power imbalance between economic and
personal rights and the legal and political ramifications of these
rights on the international stage.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Moral rights were excluded from the Trade Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Agreement (“TRIPS”) as a result of the United
States’ political and economic pressure on other signatories during the
Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(“GATT”) in 1994. 1 The United States took the point of view that
personal incentives were incompatible with a primarily economic
agreement that was meant to encourage and facilitate trade. As culture
is commodified, issues of ownership, protection, and compensation
are bound to arise. At the international level, Professor Graeme B.
Dinwoodie posited that, “the incorporation of intellectual property
agreements within trade mechanisms . . . might deprive intellectual
property policymaking of the rich palette of human values that
historically has influenced its formulation. 2 Although Dinwoodie is
not referring to the traditional divide in copyright law between
personal and property rights, his reflection brings up a salient
question in this inquiry: what role do moral rights, a “humanist”
value, play on the international stage? Should they be considered to
be a baseline right that is protected by multilateral trade and
intellectual property agreements?
To answer the question, this Essay will first define moral rights
and examine the ways in which they exemplify the diverging schools
of thought regarding copyright law. This is followed by a look at
1. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947, 61
Stat. A3, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter GATT].
2. Graeme B. Dinwoodie, The Architecture of the International Intellectual Property
System, 77 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 993, 1004 (2002).
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moral rights on the international agreement stage. Specifically, this
Essay attempts to ascertain whether moral rights have played a role in
the harmonization imperatives of international intellectual property
rights.
II. PERSONALITY AND PROPERTY: THE DICHOTOMY OF
MORAL RIGHTS
A. Moral Rights on the Old Continent
The moral rights doctrine originated in France during the 19th
century. 3 Le Droit d’Auteur (author’s rights) recognizes that the
author has a right over his creation that goes beyond exploitative
rights (the property rights approach): these rights are personal, nonpecuniary, and inseparable from human rights (the natural rights
approach). 4 According to this view, a person is born with natural
rights, though not necessarily with property rights. The former
protects the person, the latter what he owns. These moral rights have
been accepted and adopted within every civil law system within the
European Union. These general principles include the right of
paternity or attribution, and the right of integrity. 5 The right of
paternity gives the author the right to choose whether to include his
name in the work, or to publish it anonymously or under a
pseudonym. 6 This right, which is directly linked to the persona of the
author, his inner-self, cannot be licensed or assigned away. 7 In other
words, an employer who hires the author to create a work cannot avail
himself of this right, though they may own the copyright to the work.8
The right of integrity, on the other hand, protects the author’s work
from any kind of modification, distortion or mutilation. 9
3. Noreen Wiscovitch Rentas, Moral Rights Exclusion in the North American Free Trade
Agreement and the General Agreement on Tariff and Trade: A Legal Proposal for the
Inclusion of Moral Rights in Future Free Trade Agreements in Latin America and the
Caribbean, 35 REV. DER. P.R. 97 (1996).
4. DIEGO ESPÍN CÁNOVAS, MANUAL DE DERECHO CIVIL ESPAÑOL, DERECHOS REALES,
VOLUME 2, 392-398 (7th ed. 1985).
5. This Essay will not discuss moral rights as interpreted by the English/Commonwealth
common law system.
6. Arathi Ashok, Moral Rights – TRIPS and Beyond: The Indian Slant, 59 J. COPYRIGHT
SOC’Y U.S.A. 697, 700 (2013).
7. See id.
8. See id.
9. The Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works art. 6bis, Jul.
24, 1971, 828 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter Berne Convention]. The Berne Convention for the
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The copyright statutes currently in force in France, Germany,
and Italy contain provisions protecting the rights mentioned above, as
well as the right of disclosure, whether the author decides to publish
the work and make it public or keeps it private, and withdrawal. 10
Moral rights, as they are understood in Continental or mainland
Europe, are inalienable and fundamental rights that belong to the
author of each work. 11 In other words, the underlying final
justification for moral rights is linked to the individual and the
protection of his personhood.
B. Moral Rights in the United States
The US Constitution states that Congress has the power to
“[p]romote the progress of Science and useful Arts.” 12 Yet this
provision does not go far enough. Where copyright is concerned,
there needs to be a greater balance between the author’s rights and
congress’s interest in the social and economic advancement of these
domains. Specifically, the balancing approach needs to be defined
within specific limits, measuring society’s economic needs against the
author’s moral and property rights. 13 Despite its obligations under the
Berne Convention and its role as a vocal global champion of
intellectual property rights, the United States does not protect moral
rights to the same extent that its European counterparts do. 14 Instead,
the United States grants narrow moral rights to authors through the
Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990 (“VARA”), and also protects

Protection of Literary and Artistic Works originally was signed September 9, 1886, and was
revised in 1908, 1928, 1948, 1967, and 1971. The convention went into force in the United
States on March 1, 1989. The implementing legislation also went into effect on March 1, 1989.
See generally Deborah Ross, The United States Joins the Berne Convention: New Obligations
for Authors' Moral Rights, 68 N.C. L. REV. 363 (1990).
10. See Wiscovitch Rentas , supra note 3, at 104.
11. Id. However, not all European countries extend moral rights protection beyond the
term of the copyright. Germany ties moral rights protection to copyright protection in the sense
that moral rights protection ends when copyright protection ends. Conversely, in France,
inalienability is meant to apply even after the author’s copyright ends.
12. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
13. See Wiscovitch Rentas , supra note 3, at 104. A balancing approach would ensure
that authors are not proverbially sacrificed in the name of the aforementioned progress. This
line of thought posits that only protecting the work and not the author hurts the potential for
more works in the long run.
14. Peter K. Yu, Moral Rights 2.0, 1 TEX. A&M L. REV. 873, 875 (2014).

2018]

WHERE IS THE MORALITY?

777

authors from trademark infringement under the Lanham Act. 15 In
other words, moral rights are not independently considered in the
United States, as they are in Continental Europe, but are instead
cloaked in the “guise of other legal theories” such as unfair
competition, invasion of privacy, defamation, and breach of
contract. 16 In addition, the United States offers an extensive and nonexhaustive fair use doctrine, which acts as a powerful defense against
a copyright owner’s claim.
As this chapter has demonstrated, there are two conflicting
approaches to moral rights. On one hand, Continental Europe
considers moral rights to be intrinsically linked to copyright law. On
the other hand, the United States accepts moral rights, but at arm’s
length, like an extrinsic feature. These conflicting views, as this paper
will demonstrate, are magnified on the international treaty stage.
III. COMPLIANCE AND HARMONIZATION: MORAL RIGHTS IN
INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAW
A. The Berne Convention
International copyright law was enacted by the Berne
Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works of 1886.
This text established the concept of an author’s exclusive rights. 17 It
instituted a minimum standard that all member countries were
required to recognize as well as national treatment. 18 The latter is the
foundational principle of the Convention (and a trade law tenet), and
signifies that Berne signatories must grant authors the same protection
they accord to their own nationals. 19 Moral rights were only
recognized by the Convention in 1928, via an amendment that added
Article 6bis. 20 The latter’s addition to the Convention halted and

15. Brandi L. Holland, Moral Rights Protection in the United States and the Effect of the
family Entertainment and Copyright Act of 2005 on U.S. International Obligations, 39 VAND.
J. TRANSNAT’L L. 217, 233 (2006). 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (2005). 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2012).
16. Monica Killian, A Hollow Victory for the Common Law? TRIPS and the Moral
Rights Exclusion, 2 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 321 (2003).
17. Peter Burger, The Berne Convention: Its History and Its Key Role in the Future, 3
J.L. & TECH. 1, 16-17 (1988).
18. Id.
19. Id. Berne Convention, supra note 9, art. 5.
20. Berne Convention, supra note 9. “Independently of the author’s economic rights…the
author shall have the right to claim authorship of the work and to object to any distortion,
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complicated the United States’ willingness to accede to the
Convention. From Congress’s utilitarian-minded standpoint, the
natural approach to moral rights would conflict with the propertybased approach to copyright enshrined in Article 1, Section 8 of the
Constitution. However, the United States finally joined the
Convention in 1988, largely because it was in their interest to have
their intellectual property works protected abroad via the national
treatment principle and to be in a position to influence a strong
protection of their works abroad. 21 However, the United States
successfully avoided the issue of moral rights by enacting the Berne
Convention Implementation Act of 1988, which stated that the
Convention was not “self-executing in that existing law satisfied the
United States’ obligations in adhering to the Convention.” 22 As a
result, the U.S. created VARA, which grants moral rights to artists to
appease the domestic lobby and to ease the latter’s criticism for not
providing a higher standard of protection to its authors. 23 However,
considering how narrowly VARA is defined (it only protects a
specific type of artists, “visual artist”, and only protects a specific
type of art, “visual art”), and how many exceptions are in place
(“work made for hire” and “fair use”) in U.S. Copyright law, it is
surprising that the United States has been able to shield itself from the
European-led push for moral rights in international agreements. 24
Conversely, considering the technological advancements of the past
thirty years, the intellectual property shake ups caused by the digital
revolution (i.e. the borderless nature of the internet vs. the territorial
nature of copyright), and a hungry global market for US audiovisual
services and products, Congress may have to reconsider its position as
the winds of copyright change.
B. TRIPS Agreement
It is evident from the United States’ reluctance to adhere to the
Berne Convention, and its subsequent avoidance of the moral rights
provision, that international copyright harmonization, with regard to
mutilation, or other modification of, or other derogatory action in relation to, the said work,
which would be prejudicial to his honor or reputation.”
21. Id., arts. 5(1), 5(3). See generally Burger, supra note 17.
22. Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 71 F.3d 77, 83 (2d Cir. 1995) (citing S. Rep. No.
100-352, at 9-10 (1988)).
23. See Killian, supra note 16, at 330.
24. 17 U.S.C. §106(a).
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this subject, is currently off the negotiation table. 25 In fact, the United
States was able to convince the other members of the World Trade
Organization (“WTO”) to exclude Article 6bis of the Berne
Convention from the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Agreement (“TRIPS” Agreement), which incorporates the substantive
provisions of the Berne Convention. 26 Article 9.1 of the TRIPS
Agreement explicitly states that, “Members shall not have rights or
obligations under this Agreement in respect of the rights conferred
under Article 6bis of the Berne Convention or of the rights derived
therefrom.” 27 To some, this exclusion seemed surprising, since the
United States had signed the Berne Convention and incorporated
exhaustive moral rights in VARA. 28 However, this paper agrees with
Professor Dinwoodie that the internationalization of intellectual
property is “subsumed within the broader apparatus of trade
relations.” 29 The potential for harmonization of moral rights is
directly related to how much protection nations want to grant and
receive. For example, the United States purposefully excluded Article
6bis to ensure that WTO members could not use the dispute
settlement process against them with regard to this subject. 30 To
include this provision would have given moral rights teeth since the
Berne Convention provides no enforcement mechanism, meaning
signatories may be penalized for violating their obligations. 31
However, this paper wonders how much the addition of Article 6bis
into TRIPS would affect international trade? Was the United States
worried that Art. 6bis’s “honor and reputation” requirement might be
used as an affirmative defense? Similar to the “public morals” general
exception defense under Article XX of GATT? 32 Unlikely, since the
exceptions to TRIPS are clearly stated in the agreement and if
Congress was that concerned it could have fought to include moral

25. See Yu, supra note 14, at 875-76.
26. Id. at 876.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. See Dinwoodie, supra note 2, at 1003.
30. See GATT, supra note 1.
31. See Dinwoodie, supra note 2, at 995, 1005-06.
32. See GATT, supra note 1, art. XX. ( (“Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed
to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of measures: (a) necessary to
protect public morals; . . . (f) imposed for the protection of national treasures of artistic,
historic, or archeological value . . . ”).
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rights in the exceptions section of that agreement. 33 In addition, in the
US legal system, WTO law appears to have no direct effect, meaning
its provisions cannot be invoked by the parties before a court of law.
Moreover, even when an international agreement does have direct
effect, it can never claim supremacy because a federal statute may
override the international agreement. 34
Based on the national legal procedure explained above, it
appears that including moral rights in the TRIPS agreement would not
adversely affect the United States. However, its exclusion from
TRIPS, and other treaties such as NAFTA, may provoke an unbalance
of rights and obligations among the parties involved – as we will see
in the following section.
IV. IT’S COMPLICATED: THE EFFECTS OF INTERNATIONAL
COPYRIGHT AGREEMENTS ON MORAL RIGHTS
A National Treatment
National treatment is a fundamental principle in all five major
multilateral treaties concerning copyright: the Berne Convention, the
Rome Convention, the TRIPS Agreement, the WIPO Copyright
Treaty, and the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty
(“WPPT”). 35 This principle is convenient for countries as it “allows a
treaty member and its courts to apply their own law – the law they’re
familiar with.” 36 That being said, the nec plus ultra, the highest
attribute of national treatment is its “substantive bite,” as it requires
parties to the agreement to extend protection to non-nationals on the

33. For example, Article 13 of TRIPS states that, “Members shall confine limitations or
exceptions to exclusive rights to certain special cases which do not conflict with a normal
exploitation of the work and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the right
holder.” TRIPS: Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869
U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994).
34. See generally Andrew Guzman & Joost H.B. Pauwelyn, International Trade Law,
(2d ed. 2012). . The U.S. implemented the results of the Uruguay Round in the Uruguay
Round Agreements Act (URAA), P.L. 103-465. The statute states under Sec. 102(c) that no
WTO provision can operate to change prior or subsequent US law.
35. Ulrich Loewenheim, The Principle of National Treatment in the International
Conventions Protecting Intellectual Property, in PATENTS AND TECHNOLOGICAL PROGRESS
IN A GLOBALIZED WORLD: LIBER AMICORUM JOSEPH STRAUS 593 (Wolrad Prinz zu Waldeck
and Pyrmont, Martin J. Adelman, Robert Brauneis, Josef Drexl & Ralph Nack, eds. 2009).
36. Id.
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same terms as they do their nationals. 37 The potential issue is that the
exclusion of moral rights from bilateral and multilateral agreements
creates an imbalance between the relevant parties. For example, under
NAFTA, article 6bis is also excluded. 38 Therefore, parties from
Mexico and Canada would not be able to evoke moral rights in the
United States but the US party would be able to evoke these rights in
these countries, who both have moral rights established in their
national legal system. 39 Yet, it could be that this “double standard”
resulting from national treatment is not widely considered
problematic by signatories of international intellectual property
agreements. Robert Brauneis, Professor of Law at George
Washington University Law School, found that while national
treatment has been featured in over 200 GATT complaints, it has
featured in fewer than twenty TRIPS complaints; none of those
complaints involved copyright or related rights. 40 This may be
because the states involved in these agreements may or may not offer
copyright protection that exceeds minimum requirements imposed by
them. And, if additional protection is offered, it may be offered by
many other countries, thus limiting the divergence of a national
treatment rule from that of a rule of material reciprocity. 41 However,
this latter argument may be a double-edged sword because “material
reciprocity is an abrogation of the national treatment given to
protectable works of expression.” 42 For example, in Huston v. La
Cinq 43 , La Cour de cassation (the French Supreme Court) had to
decide whether to apply US copyright law or French copyright law,
when the John Huston estate sued the Turner Corporation (which
owned the economic rights to the film) as well as the French
37. Id.
38. See North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), Dec. 17, 1992, U.S.-Can.Mex. [hereinafter NAFTA], vol. I, pt. 4, ch. 17, Annex 1701.3. (“Notwithstanding, Art.
1701(2)(b), this Agreement confers no rights and imposes no obligation on the United States
with respect to Article 6bis of the Berne Convention, or the rights derived from that Article”).
39. See Rentas, supra note 3, at 23.
40. See generally Robert Brauneis, National Treatment in Copyright and Related Rights:
How Much Work Does it Do?, GW LAW FACULTY PUBLICATIONS & OTHER WORKS, PAPER
810 (2013).
41. Id.
42. See generally Stephen Frase, The Copyright Battle: Emerging International Rules
and Roadblocks on the Global Information Infrastructure, 15 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER &
INFO. L. 759 (1997).
43. Huston v. La Cinq, Cour de cassation, première chambre civile [Cass. [supreme
court for judicial matters], 1e civ., May 28, 1991, Bull. civ. I, No.172 (Fr.)
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television channel, La Cinq, regarding the rights to show a film. The
Turner Corporation wanted US law to apply, since US copyright law
would not recognize moral rights in this specific case, whereas the
Huston estate argued for French copyright law, which would have
applied the moral right of integrity. The Cour de cassation, basing its
decision on national legislation, which guarantees moral rights for all
authors of creative works, regardless of nationality, sided with
Huston’s heirs. 44 Based solely on the principle of material reciprocity
(which French law does apply to copyright in general), 45 the French
court could have refused to apply French law in order to refuse moral
rights to Huston’s work.
In her article Moral Rights of Artists in an International
Marketplace, Leslie A. Pettenati laments the lack of uniform
protection of moral rights in international agreements, positing that
the issue is bound to grow as a result of new technologies. 46 This
paper was published in 2000, before the ascension of OTTs (over-thetop media services) such as SVODs (subscription video-on-demand)
and new media platforms (e.g. the smartphone). As a result, an
author’s control over the dissemination and potential manipulation of
his or her work is becoming unmanageable and “forum shopping” for
moral rights is not a far-fetched possibility, especially considering the
fact that international intellectual property agreements remain,
perhaps purposely, vague on choice of law methods. 47
B. The Minimum Standard
As mentioned above, multilateral agreements impose minimum
requirements. These are known as “minimum standards.” The Berne
Convention, the TRIPS agreement, as well as the other copyright
agreements mentioned, have agreed to certain minimum standards in
an attempt to create, on an international scale, baseline protection (i.e.
harmonization). For example, the Berne Convention, applicable to
TRIPS, states that the duration of protection “must be granted until

44. Id.
45. See Loi N. 64-689 du 8 juillet 1964 sur l’application du principe de réciprocité en
matière de protection du droit d’auteur.
46. Leslie A. Pettenati, Moral Rights of Artists in an International Marketplace, 12 PACE
INT’L L. REV. 425 (2000).
47. Intellectual Property: Principles Governing Jurisdiction, Choice of Law, and
Judgments in Transnational Disputes (Am. Law. Inst. 2008).
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the expiration of the 50th year after the author’s death.” 48 A country
may choose to offer additional protection, such as the United States.49
Would it be necessary to include moral rights into the “minimum
standards”? As noted above, states have either already embraced these
rights in their original format (i.e. copyright law), prior to signing
these international agreements, or they have incorporated them in
their derivative, “remake” format, under contract or tort law – and
apart from the United States, most Berne-signatories have
incorporated the minimum standard for moral rights into their
national legislation.
Advances in technology and digital media, as well as
globalization, have changed the face of copyright. As Professor
Dinwoodie noted, trade law has now absorbed intellectual property,
shifting its essence of balancing economic and personal interests in
favor of the former. 50 It should therefore come as no surprise that the
TRIPS agreement, the IP section of the World Trade Organization,
would not include moral rights in its minimum standards of
protection, although the European Union negotiated in its favor. The
United States remains the world’s largest bargaining power. This
paper advances that even an additional protocol or agreement on
moral rights within the confines of WIPO or another intellectual
property organization would not lead to harmonization in this field.
For purely economic reasons, the United States will continue to
oppose transposing the European model of moral rights into its
national copyright legislation, unless a strong argument is made for
moral rights as an advantage to international trade.
V. CONCLUSION
Harmonization is not unification. It does not lead to a uniform
set of agreed rules but seeks to coordinate various legal systems by
creating minimum requirements. Harmonization facilitates the
dissemination of copyrighted works by providing transparency and
protection within the countries involved. Moral rights are currently
not on the ballot for harmonization. Even in Europe, the birthplace of
moral rights, the EU Commission does not see any need for
48. Berne Convention, supra note 9, art. 7 § 1.
49. See 17 U.S.C. § 302 (2012) (states that United States grants copyright protection for
seventy years after the death of an author).
50. See generally Dinwoodie, supra note 2.
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harmonization, and it is resisting the demands of some European
academics for community-wide regulation of moral rights. 51 This lack
of interest on the part of the Commission is even more interesting
given that it has routinely criticized the United States for its lack of
commitment to the cause of moral rights in copyright law. 52 In most
international copyright agreements, the rights that are being
harmonized are procedural more than substantive. Furthermore, none
of them are related to personal rights. Rights that are philosophically
and historically linked to a country’s evolution are difficult to
harmonize, as they imply more than a procedural modification. For
that reason alone, one can understand the Commission’s deference.
That being said, the author’s moral rights are not in any danger in the
European Union. In the United States, where these rights are reserved
to a selected few (VARA), it may be time for Congress to reassess
their stance. As mentioned above, the face of copyright is changing, it
is global and digital, and authors may start “forum shopping” for
moral rights, such as it already exists for patents.

51. See Cyrill P. Rigamonti, Destructing Moral Rights, 47 HARV. INT’L L. J. 353, 358
(2006).
52. Id.

